Abstract-The problem of simultaneously generating multiple keys for a cellular source model with a helper is investigated. In the model considered, there are four terminals, X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , and X 3 , each of which observes one component of a vector source. Terminal X 0 wishes to generate two secret keys K 1 and K 2 , respectively, with terminals X 1 and X 2 under the help of terminal X 3 . All terminals are allowed to communicate over a public channel. An eavesdropper is assumed to have access to the public discussion. Both symmetric and asymmetric key generations are considered. In symmetric key generation models, model 1a (with a trusted helper) requires that the two keys are concealed from the eavesdropper, and model 1b (with an untrusted helper) further requires that the two keys are concealed from the helper in addition to the eavesdropper. The asymmetric key generation models 2a and 2b are the same as symmetric key generation models 1a and 1b, respectively, except that the key K 2 is further required to be concealed from terminal X 1 . For all models studied, the key capacity region is established by designing a unified achievable strategy to achieve the cut-set outer bounds. We also study the problem of generating more than two keys and characterize its key capacity region when all the cellular terminals are required to generate independent keys with the base station.
it has been shown that such a secret key can be established between two remote terminals if each terminal has access to a component of a vector source sequence and the two terminals can communicate with each other via a public channel. The generated key can be kept secure from the eavesdropper, which has full access to the public channel. The key capacity for the two-terminal source model has been established in these studies. Since then, various models of key generation with public discussion have been studied. In [4] , the model with two terminals and a helper was studied and the key capacity was characterized when there is no rate constraint on the public discussion. Later, in [5] , the problem of secret key generation among multiple (more than two) terminals was studied and the key capacity was established when there is no constraint on the public discussion. In [6] , the same problem was revisited, and the scenario with only a subset of terminals being allowed to talk publicly was studied and the capacity was characterized. In [7] , an alternative form of the secret key capacity for the multi-terminal source model was characterized in terms of mutual dependence, which can be interpreted as generalization of mutual information to more than two variables.
All the studies described above considered the problem of generating a single secret key. More recently, there is increasing interest in the problem of simultaneously generating multiple secret/private keys over source models. The model of generating a secret key and a private key among three terminals was first studied in [8] , in which three terminals observe correlated source outputs, and all three terminals wish to agree on a common secret key to be kept secure from an eavesdropper while two designated terminals wish to agree on a private key to be kept secure from both the third terminal and the eavesdropper. In [8] , an outer bound on the key capacity region was provided and was shown to be achievable under a certain condition. More recently, in [9] and [10] , it was further shown that the outer bound established in [8] is also achievable for the remaining cases of this model by employing a random binning and joint decoding scheme. Hence, the key capacity region for this model is established in general. Another so-called cellular source model was recently studied in [11] and [12] in which one (base station) terminal wishes to generate independent keys respectively with a number of (mobile) terminals. In [11] , the key sum capacity was established, and inner and outer bounds on the key capacity region were derived for the special case of two-key generation with an helper. In [12] , the key capacity region was established for a two-key generation model with an additional requirement that one key should also be kept secure from the other mobile terminals.
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See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. To the best of our knowledge, so far the multi-key capacity region is characterized only for three-terminal systems. It is thus of interest to investigate whether it is possible to characterize the multi-key capacity region for systems with more than three terminals. Such exploration needs to address two challenging issues. 1) Although the key capacity region for the three-terminal model [8] , [10] , [12] was shown to be equal to the cut-set bound, it is not clear at the outset whether the cut-set bound can still be achieved for models with different secrecy requirements and for four-terminal models with an additional helper. In general, cut-set bound is less likely achievable as the system gets more complicated. 2) For the three-terminal model, there are three cuts for generating two keys, and schemes can be designed to achieve corner points of the cut-set bound for each case of the source distribution. However, for four-terminal models with a helper, there are six cuts for generating two keys, and these six cuts yield eight possible cases of the cut-set bound due to different source distributions. It is not clear whether there exists a unified design of schemes to achieve the cut-set bound for all cases.
Our contribution in this paper lies in establishing key capacity regions for four source models (see Figures 1, 2, 3 , and 4) of generating a pair of keys, and our results provide affirmative answers to both of the above issues. In all models, there are four terminals, and each terminal observes one component of a correlated vector source. Terminals X 0 and X 1 wish to agree on a key K 1 , and terminals X 0 and X 2 wish to agree on another independent key K 2 . The four terminals are allowed to communicate over a pubic channel, and an eavesdropper is assumed to have access to the public discussion without ambiguity. The four models differentiate from each other due to secrecy constraints. Models 1a and 1b address symmetric key generation, in which secrecy requirements for two keys are the same. Model 1a (with a trusted helper) requires that the two keys are concealed from the eavesdropper, and model 1b (with an untrusted helper) further requires that the two keys are concealed from terminal X 3 in addition to the eavesdropper. In the untrusted helper case, we assume that the helper is curious but honest, i.e., the helper attempts to infer the information about the generated keys but still follows the protocol. Models 2a and 2b (with a trusted and an untrusted helper) have the same secrecy requirements for the two keys as models 1a and 1b, respectively, except that the key K 2 is further required to be concealed from terminal X 1 for both models. Thus, models 2a and 2b address asymmetric key generation.
For all of the above four models, we establish the cut-set bound to be the key capacity region by showing that the cutset bound is indeed achievable. Furthermore, we construct a unified achievable strategy to achieve the corner points of the cut-set bound corresponding to all cases of source distributions. The schemes to achieve different cases vary only in the rate at which each terminal reveals information to public. Thus, the achievability proof is significantly simplified. More specifically, the achievable strategy is based on random binning and joint decoding. Given such a unified strategy, we derive the Slepian-Wolf conditions that guarantee correct key agreement and derive sufficient conditions that guarantee the secrecy requirements. Then for each individual case, it is sufficient to verify the public transmission rates of terminals satisfy the derived Slepian-Wolf conditions and secrecy conditions, which can be performed easily. Furthermore, following suggestion by an anonymous reviewer, we provide an alternative argument of the achievability based on output statistics of random binning (OSRB) theorem and Fourier Motzkin elimination without having to consider separate cases of source distributions.
Thanks to one anonymous reviewer, we establish the key capacity region for the problem of generating more than 2 keys in a cellular network, via exploring the OSRB theorem, Fourier Motzkin elimination and some submodularity technique. This fully characterizes the capacity region for the case in which all users are required to generate keys, which improves the result in [11] where only sum rate optimal scheme is developed. As a future direction, it will be interesting to consider the case of generating multiple keys with possible assist from a group of dedicated helpers, using the techniques developed in Section IV.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system models. Section III provides our main results on the key capacity region for four models and describes intuition to design key generation schemes. Section IV discusses the problem of generating more than two keys in a network and characterizes the capacity region. Section V concludes this paper with comments. Appendices provide the detailed technical proofs of our main results.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
Consider system models (see Figures 1, 2, 3 , and 4) with four distinct terminals X i , i = 0, · · · , 3, each of which observes one of the four components of a discrete memoryless vector source generated based on a joint distribution P X 0 X 1 X 2 X 3 . Here, for simplicity, we also use X i to denote the finite alphabet set from which the random variable X i takes values. Terminal X i observes n independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of X i , denoted by X n i . The four terminals can communicate interactively via a public channel with no rate constraints. The public channel is noiseless in the sense that all four terminals and an eavesdropper can access the public discussion without ambiguity. We assume that the eavesdropper does not observe any further information such as source sequences. Without loss of generality, we assume that the four terminals take turns to transmit for r rounds over 4r consecutive slots. We use 4r random variables F 1 , . . . , F 4r to denote these transmissions, where F t denotes the transmission in time slot t for 1 ≤ t ≤ 4r . The transmission F t is a deterministic function of its own observation X n t mod 4 and all previous transmissions
. We use F to denote all transmissions in 4r rounds, i.e., F = (F 1 , . . . , F 4r ).
In this paper, we study four models, and in all models the base station terminal X 0 wishes to agree on independent keys K 1 and K 2 with mobile terminals X 1 and X 2 , respectively, under the help of terminal X 3 . The models differentiate from each other due to secrecy requirements. Models 1a and 1b address symmetric key generation, in which secrecy requirements for two keys are the same. Model 1a (with a trusted helper) requires that the two keys are concealed from the eavesdropper, and model 1b (with an untrusted helper) further requires that the two keys are concealed from terminal X 3 in addition to the eavesdropper. Models 2a and 2b (with a trusted and an untrusted helper) have the same secrecy requirements for the two keys as models 1a and 1b, respectively, except that the key K 2 is further required to be concealed from terminal X 1 for both models. Thus, models 2a and 2b address asymmetric key generation.
We next introduce mathematical conditions that a key pair (K 1 , K 2 ) should satisfy. A random variable U is said to be -recoverable from another random variable V , if there exists a function f such that
(1)
For all models studied in this paper, the key K 1 is required to be -recoverable at terminals X 0 and X 1 with the public transmission F, i.e., it can be -recoverable from (X n 0 , F) and (X n 1 , F), respectively, and the key K 2 is required to be -recoverable at terminals X 0 and X 2 with public transmission F, i.e., it can be -recoverable from (X n 0 , F) and (X n 2 , F), respectively. Furthermore, K 1 and K 2 should satisfy the uniformity conditions:
where K 1 and K 2 denote the alphabets of the random variables K 1 and K 2 , respectively. Furthermore, the two keys are required to be independent, i.e.,
For symmetric key generation with a trusted helper (model 1a) and with an untrusted helper (model 1b), K 1 and K 2 are required to respectively satisfy the secrecy conditions
and
For asymmetric key generation with a trusted helper (model 2a) and with an untrusted helper (model 2b), K 1 and K 2 are required to respectively satisfy the secrecy conditions
We note that the parameter in (2)-(8) can be arbitrarily small as the sequence length n gets sufficiently large. Definition 1: For each of the above models, a rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable if for every > 0, δ > 0, and for sufficiently large n, a key pair (K 1 , K 2 ) can be generated to satisfy
and (4), (5), (2) , and (3) for symmetric key generation with a trusted helper, to satisfy (9), (4), (6), (2) , and (3) for symmetric key generation with an untrusted helper, to satisfy (9), (7), (2), (3) for asymmetric key generation with a trusted helper, and to satisfy (9) , (8), (2), (3) for asymmetric key generation with an untrusted helper. Our goal is to characterize the key capacity region that contains all achievable rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) for all models.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we provide characterizations of the key capacity region for the four models described in Section II. We also provide intuitive understanding of these regions and key generation schemes for achieving these regions with the detailed technical proofs relegated to appendices.
A. Symmetric Key Generation With a Trusted Helper
In this subsection, we study the problem of symmetric key generation with a trusted helper, in which the generated two keys are required to be secure only from the eavesdropper. To assist the presentation, we introduce the following notations:
The following theorem characterizes the key capacity region of this model. 
Since the secrecy constraints on K 1 and K 2 are symmetric, the bounds on R 1 and R 2 are also symmetric. These bounds can be intuitively understood as cut-set bounds. In particular, the upper bound on R 1 in (11) is due to two cuts separating X 0 and X 1 for generating K 1 (two more bounds on R 1 due to the other two cuts separating X 0 and X 1 become redundant due to the sum rate bound (13) ). The upper bound on R 2 in (12) is due to two cuts separating X 0 and X 2 for generating K 2 (two more bounds on R 2 due to the other two cuts separating X 0 and X 1 become redundant due to the sum rate bound (13) ). The sum rate bound (13) is due to the two cuts separating X 0 and (X 1 , X 2 ) for generating the two keys K 1 and K 2 simultaneously.
The structure of the key capacity region is illustrated in Fig. 5 as the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O. We next describe the idea of constructing an achievable scheme to achieve the key capacity region. It suffices to show the achievability of the points P and Q. Since the secrecy constraints on K 1 and K 2 are symmetric, it is sufficient to show that the corner point P is achievable, and then the achievability of the point Q follows by symmetry. We assume that R A < R C , because otherwise the point P would collapse to the point A, which is shown to be achievable by the previous work [5] . The key rate pair of the point P is given by R 1 = R A and R 2 = R C − R A . Corresponding to different source distributions, each of R A and R C can take one of the two mutual information terms given in (10a) and (10c), respectively. Hence, the coordinates of the point P can take four forms, i.e., case 1 with
We construct a unified scheme to achieve the rate point P for all cases. In our unified scheme, terminals X 1 , X 2 , and X 3 reveal enough information to public so that terminal X 0 can recover X n 1 , X n 2 and X n 3 . Then, K 1 is generated by terminals X 0 and X 1 based on X n 1 , and K 2 is generated by terminals X 0 and X 2 based on X n 2 . The schemes for the four cases are different only in the rate at which each terminal reveals information to public. LetR 1 ,R 2 andR 3 denote the rates at which terminals X 1 , X 2 and X 3 reveal information to public, respectively. In the following, we explain the main idea of the achievable scheme for each case.
Case 1: The key rate pair of the point P is given by
Since the rate of K 1 needs to be maximized, terminal X 1 should reveal as little information as possible. Hence, terminals X 2 and X 3 first reveal information at the rateR 2 +R 3 = H (X 2 X 3 |X 0 ) so that terminal X 1 needs to release only at the rateR 1 = H (X 1 |X 0 X 2 X 3 ) in order for X 0 to recover X n 1 . Thus, the rate of K 1 can be as large as I (X 1 ; X 0 X 2 X 3 ). Since the generation of K 1 already uses up information contained in X n 1 , K 2 can be generated only based on information contained in X n 2 and X n 3 given X n 1 . Thus, R 2 can be as large as
, where the subtraction is due to public discussion at the rateR 2 
Case 2: The key rate pair of the point P is given
The argument for R 1 is the same as that for case 1. In case 2,
Thus, in order for terminal X 0 to recover X n 2 and X n 3 , it is more efficient to let X 3 reveal information first at the rateR 3 = H (X 3 |X 0 ), and then let X 2 reveal information at the rateR 2 = H (X 2 |X 0 X 3 ). Since in this case X 2 does not recover X n 3 , the key rate
The key rate pair of the point P is given by
implies that X 0 and X 2 have high correlation, and X 1 and X 3 have high correlation. Thus, a natural idea for public discussion is to let terminal X 0 recover X n 2 and let X 1 recover X n 3 first, and then generate K 1 between terminals X 0 and X 1 to achieve R 1 = I (X 0 X 2 ; X 1 X 3 ). Since X n 1 and X n 3 have been fully used for generating K 1 , then K 2 can achieve the rate
, where the subtraction is due to the public transmission of terminal X 2 to let X 0 recover X n 2 . Case 4: This case does not exist because of the contradiction induced by setting R A = I (X 0 X 2 ; X 1 X 3 ) and R C = I (X 0 X 3 ; X 1 X 2 ) (see (79), (80) in the proof for details).
We next briefly describes (see Appendix B for more details) an alternative approach to prove the achievability of Theorem 1 without considering various cases. 1 The general idea still follows the unified scheme described above. Similarly to Appendix A, the Slepian-Wolf conditions (38)-(44) are still needed to satisfy the requirement that key generating parties generate the same key. To guarantee the secrecy requirement (5), we apply OSRB theorem ( [14] , Th. 1) and obtain the secrecy conditions. The desired key rate region given in Theorem 1 then follows by applying Fourier Motzkin elimination to remove the other binning rates from these conditions.
We note that the two proofs complement each other and unveil different aspects of the problem of multiple key generation. The first proof directly exhibit the design of the key generation scheme under each case, but sometimes analyzing all cases can be cumbersome. On the other hand, the alternative proof provides a unified way of obtaining the key rate region, but Fourier Motzkin method does not illustrate the achievable scheme design for individual cases.
B. Symmetric Key Generation With an Untrusted Helper
In this subsection, we study the problem of symmetric key generation with an untrusted helper, in which the two generated keys are required to be secure from both the eavesdropper and the helper terminal X 3 . The following theorem characterizes the key capacity region of this model.
Theorem 2: The key capacity region for symmetric key generation with an untrusted helper contains rate pairs
satisfying the following inequalities:
These bounds can also be intuitively understood as cut-set bounds. In particular, the upper bound on R 1 in (14) is due to the cut separating X 0 and X 1 for generating K 1 (one more bound due to the other cut separating X 0 and X 1 is redundant due to the sum rate bound (16)). The upper bound on R 2 in (15) is due to the cut separating X 0 and X 2 for generating 1 We greatly thank one anonymous reviewer who suggested this approach. The key capacity region for symmetric key generation with an untrusted helper.
K 2 (one more bound due to the other cut separating X 0 and X 1 is redundant due to the sum rate bound (16)). The sum rate bound (16) is due to the cut separating X 0 and (X 1 , X 2 ) for generating two keys K 1 and K 2 simultaneously. All the bounds (14)- (16) are conditioned on X 3 because both K 1 and K 2 are required to be secure from terminal X 3 .
Comparing Theorem 2 with Theorem 1, it is clear that the key capacity region for symmetric key generation with an untrusted helper is contained in the key capacity region for symmetric key generation with a trusted helper, because it always holds that I (
. This is reasonable due to the additional requirement for the keys to be concealed from the helper when the helper is untrusted.
The structure of the key capacity region is illustrated in Fig. 6 as the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O. In order to justify the achievability of the region, by symmetry, it is sufficient to show the achievability of the point P in Fig. 6 . The rate pair at point P is given by (I (
The idea to achieve the point P follows the unified strategy described in Section III-A, i.e., public discussion first guarantees that terminal X 0 recovers X n 1 , X n 2 and X n 3 correctly, and then K 1 is generated by terminals X 0 and X 1 based on X n 1 and K 2 is generated by terminals X 0 and X 2 based on X n 2 . Since the generated keys should be concealed from the helper terminal X 3 , X n 3 cannot be used as random resource for generating the keys, although the helper can still participate the public discussion to assist the recovery of source sequences.
More specifically, since the rate of K 1 needs to be maximized, terminal X 1 should reveal as little information as possible. Hence, terminals X 2 and X 3 first reveal information at the rateR 2 +R 3 = H (X 2 X 3 |X 0 ) so that terminal X 1 needs to release only at the rateR 1 = H (X 1 |X 0 X 2 X 3 ) in order for X 0 to recover X n 1 . Thus, the rate of K 1 can be as large as I (X 1 ; X 0 X 2 |X 3 ). Since X 3 is an untrusted helper, it can reveal information at any rate. Hence,R 2 can be set
Since the generation of K 1 already uses up information contained in X n 1 , K 2 can be generated only based on information contained in X n 2 given X n 1 and X n 3 .
Similarly to the argument in Section III-A and Appendix B, the achievability can be shown by an alternative approach based on OSRB theorem [14] and Fourier Motzkin elimination. More specifically, to guarantee the secrecy requirement (6), OSRB theorem implies the following conditions:
(20)
C. Asymmetric Key Generation With a Trusted Helper
In this subsection, we study the problem of asymmetric key generation with a trusted helper, in which the two generated keys are required to be kept secure from the eavesdropper, and furthermore, the key K 2 is also required to be kept secure from terminal X 1 . For concise presentation, we introduce the following notations:
(21a)
We note that the expressions of R A and R C remain unchanged comparing with those in Section III-A, but R B is different from R B by having X 1 in the conditioning.
The following theorem characterizes the key capacity region of the model of interest.
Theorem 3: The key capacity region for asymmetric key generation with a trusted helper contains rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying the following inequalities:
, then the helper terminal is not able to help in the key generation. In such a case, the key capacity region characterized in Theorem 3 reduces to that established in [12] for the same model without a helper.
The bounds in Theorem 3 can be intuitively understood as cut-set bounds. In particular, the upper bound on R 1 in (22) is due to the two cuts separating X 0 and X 1 for generating K 1 (two more bounds on R 1 due to the other two cuts separating X 0 and X 1 are redundant due to the sum rate bound (24)). The sum rate bound (24) is due to the cut separating X 0 and (X 1 , X 2 ) for generating two keys K 1 and K 2 simultaneously. The upper bound on R 2 in (23) is due to the cut separating X 0 and X 2 for generating K 2 , and the conditioning on X 1 is due to the requirement that K 2 be concealed from X 1 .
The key capacity region is illustrated in Fig. 7 as the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O. We next describe our idea of constructing an achievable scheme to achieve the key capacity region. Since the secrecy requirements for the two keys are different, we need to design achievable schemes to achieve the points P and Q separately. Corresponding to different source distributions, the rate pairs of the points P and Q can take different forms. Interestingly, the same unified strategy described for the previous models can achieve the points P and Q for all cases. Namely, terminals X 1 , X 2 and X 3 reveal information to public such that terminal X 0 can recover (X n 1 , X n 2 , X n 3 ) correctly. Then K 1 is generated based on X n 1 and K 2 is generated based on X n 2 . The schemes for different cases vary only in the rate at which each terminal reveals information to public. Here, we still useR 1 ,R 2 andR 3 to denote the corresponding rates that terminals X 1 , X 2 and X 3 reveal information to public.
For the point P, it can be observed that its rate coordinates are exactly the same as those in Section III-A, and can be shown to be achievable by the same schemes designed in Section III-A for symmetric key generation with a trusted helper. Both models should reach the same maximum rate R 1 of K 1 due to the same secrecy requirement for K 1 . Furthermore, since both models should exhaust all random resource in X n 1 for generating K 1 , K 2 should be generated from random resource independent from X n 1 even if it is not required to be concealed from terminal X 1 in symmetric key generation. Thus, the two models also have the same rate R 2 at the point P.
For the point Q, the rate coordinates are given by (R C − R B , R B ). Corresponding to different source distributions, each of R C and R B can take one of the two mutual information terms given in (24) and (23), respectively. Hence, the coordinates of the point Q can take four forms, i.e., case 1 with
and R B = I (X 0 ; X 2 X 3 |X 1 ); and case 4 with R C = I (X 0 X 3 ; X 1 X 2 ) and R B = I (X 2 ; X 0 X 3 |X 1 ). In the following, we explain the idea of the achievable scheme for each case and relegate the detailed proof to Appendix D. We note that achievable designs for the following cases are different due to the source distributions that determine these cases.
Case 1: The key rate pair of the point Q is given by (I (X 0 ; X 1 ), I (X 0 ; X 2 X 3 |X 1 )). In order to generate K 1 at the rate I (X 0 ; X 1 ), terminal X 1 can reveal information at the rateR 1 
terminals X 2 and X 3 jointly release information at the sum ratẽ
Case 2: The key rate pair of the point Q is given by
). Terminals X 1 and X 3 first jointly reveal information at the sum ratẽ
and X n 3 correctly. Terminal X 2 needs to release information only at the rateR 2 = H (X 2 |X 0 X 1 X 3 ) and then X n 2 can be successfully recovered at X 0 . Thus, K 2 can be generated at the rate
Case 3: This case does not exist because of the contradiction induced by setting R C = I (X 0 X 3 ; X 1 X 2 ) and R B = I (X 0 ; X 2 X 3 |X 1 ) (see (123) and (124) in the proof for details).
Case 4: The key rate pair of the point Q is given
). Still, terminals X 1 and X 3 first reveal information at the sum rateR 1 +R 3 = H (X 1 X 3 |X 0 ). Due to the case conditions, X 3 has high correlation with X 0 and hence let X 3 reveal its information at the rateR 3 = H (X 3 |X 0 ). Then X 1 reveals its information at the rateR 1 = H (X 1 |X 0 X 3 ), and finally X 2 reveals its information at the rateR 2 
. Thus, the key rate R 2 = I (X 0 X 3 ; X 2 |X 1 ), and the rate R 1 = I (X 0 X 3 ; X 1 ).
We note that for asymmetric key generation with a trusted helper, the point Q achieves the same sum rate as that for symmetric key generation with a trusted helper. This is because although the rate of K 2 decreases in the asymmetric model due to the additional secrecy requirement for K 2 to be concealed from X 1 , the random resource contained in X n 1 can still be used for generating K 1 so that there is no loss in the sum rate.
Similarly to the argument in Section III-A and Appendix B, the achievability of Theorem 3 can be shown by an alternative approach based on OSRB theorem [14] and Fourier Motzkin elimination. More specifically, to guarantee the secrecy requirement (7), OSRB theorem indicates the following conditions:
D. Asymmetric Key Generation With an Untrusted Helper
In this subsection, we study the problem of asymmetric key generation with an untrusted helper, in which the two generated keys are required to be kept secure from both the eavesdropper and the helper terminal X 3 , and furthermore, the key K 2 is required to be kept secure from terminal X 1 . The following theorem characterizes the key capacity region for this model. 
(33) Proof: See Appendix E. These bounds can also be intuitively understood as cut-set bounds. In particular, the upper bound on R 1 in (31) is due to the cut separating X 0 and X 1 for generating K 1 (one more bound due tothe other cut separating X 0 and X 1 is redundant due to the sum rate bound (33)). The upper bound on R 2 in (32) is due to the cut separating X 0 and X 2 for generating K 2 , and the conditioning on X 1 is due to the requirement that K 2 be concealed from X 1 . The sum rate bound (33) is due to the cut separating X 0 and (X 1 , X 2 ) for generating two keys K 1 and K 2 simultaneously. All these bounds (31)-(33) are conditioned on X 3 because both K 1 and K 2 are required to be kept secure from terminal X 3 .
Similarly to the symmetric case, comparing Theorem 4 with Theorem 3, it is clear that the key capacity region for asymmetric key generation with an untrusted helper is contained in that for the asymmetric key generation with a trusted helper, because it always holds that I (
. This is anticipated due to the additional requirement for the keys to be concealed from the helper.
The key capacity region is illustrated in Fig. 8 as the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O. It can be shown that the point P can be achieved by the same scheme as that for achieving the point P in symmetric key generation with an untrusted helper in Section III-B. We next describe the idea to achieve the point Q. The rate pair of the point Q is given by (I (X 0 ; X 1 |X 3 ), I (X 2 ; X 0 |X 1 X 3 )). Terminals X 1 and X 3 first reveal information at the rateR 1 +R 3 = H (X 1 X 3 |X 0 ) so that terminal X 0 can recover X n 1 and X n 3 correctly. Then terminal X 2 needs to release only at the rateR 2 = H (X 2 |X 0 X 1 X 3 ) in order for X 0 to recover X n 2 . Thus, the rate of K 2 can be as large as I (X 2 ; X 0 |X 1 X 3 ). Since X 3 is an untrusted helper, it can reveal information at any rate. Hence,R 1 can be set to be
Similarly to the argument in Section III-A and Appendix B, the achievability of Theorem 4 can be shown by an alternative approach based on OSRB theorem [14] and Fourier Motzkin elimination. More specifically, to guarantee the secrecy requirement (8) , OSRB theorem indicates the following conditions:
IV. MULTI-KEY GENERATION FOR CELLUAR NETWORK
In this section, we consider the case of simultaneously establishing more than two symmetric keys {K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K m }, one for each mobile terminal in a set of users {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m }, with a base station terminal Z, where all participants observe one component of correlated sequences. In this setting, each mobile terminal is required to generate one secret key with the base station terminal, where all the secret keys are required to be kept secure from the eavesdropper which has access to the public discussion but has no source observation of its own.
In this section and Appendix G, with a slight inconsistence in notation, we use Z instead of X 0 to denote the base station terminal for notation convenience. Furthermore, for 
for every S ⊂ [m].
Proof: See Appendix G. There are two major steps for the proof of such generalization. First, by using the OSRB approach, we can obtain an achievability region, which contains bounds on key rates as well as other binning rates. Then, in order to obtain the final key rate region, other binning rates should be removed via the Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure. At the first sight, the key rate region is very difficult to characterize (if not impossible) for the case with arbitrary number of keys because the Fourier-Motzkin elimination is very complex when many variables and inequalities are involved. Thanks to one anonymous reviewer, a novel argument is developed to show that the achievable region matches the cut-set outer bound by exploiting the submodularity of some functions.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we study the problem of generating a pair of keys for a cellular source model with a helper. We establish the full key capacity region for four models with different secrecy requirements. The models here consist of four terminals, which are more complicated to analyze than three-terminal models studied previously, because the cut-set outer bound takes more cases due to different source distributions. Instead of designing a specific achievable scheme for each case one by one, we develop a unified strategy, which achieves corner points for all cases, and hence significantly reduces the complexity of the achievability proof.
We also generalize the studies to cellular models with more than two mobile terminals, in which each terminal wishes to generate a key with the base station. It is of future interest to extend the general case with various secrecy constraints and possible assistance from a group of dedicated helper. Recent study [15] discusses the model of generating private key with multiple helpers in a pairwise independent network and may provide useful insights and techniques.
Another future direction is to study multiple key generation problems with rate constraints on the public discussion. For such a case, previous studies of the source model with the helper subject to finite rate constraints in [4] and of vector Gaussian source model with public discussion subject to finite rate constraints in [16] provide useful techniques.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1

A. Proof of Converse
First, if we need only to generate K 1 , the model reduces to the secret key generation problem studied in [5] . The key capacity is shown to be min{R A , R C }, which provides an upper bound (11) on R 1 . Similarly, if we dedicate to generate K 2 , the key capacity is shown to be min{R B , R C } in [5] , which provides an upper bound (12) on R 2 . For the sum rate bound, we consider an enhanced model by replacing terminals X 1 and X 2 with a super terminal X s that observes both X n 1 and X n 2 . The secret key rate between X 0 and X s is upper bounded by R C as shown in [5] .
B. Proof of Achievability
We design an achievable scheme to achieve the key capacity region plotted in Fig. 5 as the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O, where the coordinates of the points A and B are (min{R A , R C }, 0) and (0, min{R B , R C }), respectively. The corner point A is achieved by letting X 2 be a dedicated helper to generate K 1 following the omniscience scheme in [5] . Similarly, the corner point B is achieved by letting X 1 be a dedicated helper to generate K 2 as shown in [5] . We note that the point P would collapse to the point A if R C ≤ R A and the point Q would collapse to the point B if R C ≤ R B . It is thus sufficient to show that the points P and Q are achievable whenever they are different from the points A and B, respectively. Then the entire pentagon can be achieved by time sharing.
We note that since the secrecy constraints on K 1 and K 2 are symmetric, it is sufficient to show that the corner point P in Fig. 5 is achievable and the achievability of the point Q follows by symmetry. We assume that R A < R C , because otherwise the point P would collapse to the point A and has been justified to be achievable. The key rate pair of the point P can take different forms due to different source distributions. In the following, we first describe a unified scheme that is applicable to all cases, and then study each case one by one. In general, our scheme is based on random binning and joint decoding.
Codebook Generation: At terminal X 1 , randomly and independently assign a bin index f to each sequence x n 1 ∈ X n 1 , where f ∈ [1 : 2 nR 1 ]. We use f (x n 1 ) to denote the bin index of the sequence x n 1 , and use B 1 ( f ) to denote the bin indexed by f . Then randomly and independently assign a sub-bin index φ to each sequence in each nonempty bin B 1 ( f ), where φ ∈ [1 : 2 n R 1 ]. We further use B 1 ( f, φ) to denote the sub-bin indexed by φ within the bin B 1 ( f ).
At terminal X 2 , randomly and independently assign a bin index g to each sequence x n 2 ∈ X n 2 , where g ∈ [1 :
We use g(x n
2 ) to denote the bin index of the sequence x n 2 , and use B 2 (g) to denote the bin indexed by g. Then randomly and independently assign a sub-bin index ψ to each sequence in each nonempty bin B 2 (g), where ψ ∈ [1 : 2 n R 2 ]. We further use B 2 (g, ψ) to denote the sub-bin indexed by ψ within the bin B 2 (g).
At terminal X 3 , randomly and independently assign a bin index l to each sequence x n 3 ∈ X n 3 , where l ∈ [1 : 2 nR 3 ]. We use l(x n 3 ) to denote the bin index of the sequence x n 3 , and use B 3 (l) to denote the bin indexed by l.
The codebook is revealed to all parties, i.e., terminals X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 and the eavesdropper.
Encoding and Transmission: Given a sequence x n 1 , terminal X 1 finds the index pair ( f, φ) such that x n 1 ∈ B 1 ( f, φ). Then it reveals the index f = f (x n 1 ) over the public channel to all parties.
Given a sequence x n 2 , terminal X 2 finds the index pair (g, ψ) such that x n 2 ∈ B 2 (g, ψ). Then it reveals the index g = g(x n 2 ) over the public channel to all parties.
Given a sequence x n 3 , terminal X 3 finds the index l such that x n 3 ∈ B 3 (l). Then it reveals the index l = l(x n 3 ) over the public channel to all parties.
Decoding: The decoding scheme is based on joint typicality. Terminal X 0 , given x n 0 and the bin indexes f , g and l, claimsx n 1 ,x n 2 andx n 3 are observations of terminals X 1 , X 2 and X 3 , respectively, if there exists a unique tuple of sequences
Based on Slepian-Wolf coding theorem [5] , [17] , the decoding error can be arbitrarily small if the ratesR 1 ,R 2 andR 3 satisfy the following Slepian-Wolf conditions:
Key Generation:
. If the decoding error vanishes asymptotically (i.e., (38)-(44) are satisfied), we have
Secrecy: We derive the sufficient conditions for achieving the secrecy requirement (5). Then these sufficient conditions need to be verified for each of the four cases later on.
We evaluate the key leakage rates averaged over the random codebook ensemble. Let f := f (X n 1 ), g := g(X n 2 ) and l := l(X n 3 ). Then it is clear that F = { f, g, l}. We further let φ := φ(X n 1 ) and ψ := ψ(X n 2 ). Hence, K 1 = φ and K 2 = ψ. We first derive
≤ I (ψ; g|C)+ I (g, ψ; f, l|C)+ I (φ; f |C)+ I (φ; g, ψ, l| f, C) ≤ I (ψ; g|C)+ I (g, ψ; f, l|C)+ I (φ; f |C)+ I ( f, φ; g, ψ, l|C). (47)
We next consider each of the four terms in (47). It can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if
and ifR
In order to bound the second term in (47), we have the following derivation:
We now introduce the following lemma to bound the last term in the preceding equation.
Lemma 1: IfR
Next we consider the last term in (47) as follows:
Similarly to Lemma 1, it can be shown that if
Consequently,
Therefore, (48), (49), (50) and (51a)-(51c) are sufficient conditions that guarantee the secrecy requirement (5) .
Uniformity: Uniformity of keys is due to properties of random binning and typicality.
We next show the achievability of the point P with rate coordinates R 1 = R A and R 2 = R C − R A . Corresponding to different source distributions, each of R A and R C can take one of the two mutual information terms given in (10a) and (10c), respectively. Hence, the coordinates of the point P can take four forms, i.e., case 1 with R A = I (X 1 ; X 0 X 2 X 3 ) and R C = I (X 0 ; X 1 X 2 X 3 ), case 2 with R A = I (X 1 ; X 0 X 2 X 3 ) and R C = I (X 0 X 3 ; X 1 X 2 ), case 3 with R A = I (X 0 X 2 ; X 1 X 3 ) and R C = I (X 0 ; X 1 X 2 X 3 ), and case 4 with R A = I (X 0 X 2 ; X 1 X 3 ) and R C = I (X 0 X 3 ; X 1 X 2 ).
For each case, it is sufficient to set the ratesR 1 , R 1 ,R 2 , R 2 andR 3 to satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (38)-(44) for guaranteeing correct key agreement and to satisfy the sufficient conditions (48), (49), (50) and (51a)-(51c) for guaranteeing secrecy.
Case 1:
The rate pair at the point P is given by
). To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates in the achievable strategy as follows:
It can be verified that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (38)-(44) ifR 3 
Otherwise, either the Markov chain X 3 − X 1 − X 0 X 2 or the Markov chain X 3 − X 0 − X 1 X 2 or the Markov chain X 3 − X 2 − X 0 X 1 holds and the first two Markov chains violate case assumptions (52) and (53) respectively. Moreover, if the last Markov chain holds, the rate pair can be easily achieved without the helper's assistance. It can also be verified that the above rates (55)-(59) satisfy the sufficient conditions (48), (49), (50) and (51a)-(51c) for secrecy. Case 2: R A = I (X 1 ; X 0 X 2 X 3 ) and R C = I (X 0 X 3 ; X 1 X 2 ), which imply the following two inequalities:
Here, R A < R C is equivalent to
The key rate pair at the point P in this case is given
. To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates in the achievable strategy as follows:
It can be verified that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (38)-(44) and the sufficient conditions (48), (49), (50) and (51a)-(51c) for secrecy. In particular, (50) holds due to (61) as follows:
and (51a)-(51c) hold due to (61) as follows:
Case 3: R A = I (X 0 X 2 ; X 1 X 3 ) and R C = I (X 0 ; X 1 X 2 X 3 ), which imply the following two inequalities:
The rate pair of the point P is given by 0 ) ). To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates as follows:
Otherwise, the Markov chain X 3 − X 1 − X 0 X 2 holds and thus the rate pair can be easily achieved without the helper's assistance. It is also easy to verify that the rate settings (71)-(75) satisfy the sufficient conditions (48), (49) and (51a)-(51c) for secrecy. Furthermore, the condition (50) is satisfied if
Otherwise, the Markov chain X 1 X 3 − X 2 − X 0 holds. To show the secrecy, we derive a new condition to replace (50) to guarantee that I (g, ψ; f, l|C) is asymptotically small as follows.
It can be shown that if
Thus, I (g, ψ; f, l|C) < δ( ). It is clear that the rates given in (71)- (75) satisfy (77) and hence secrecy is guaranteed. Case 4: R A = I (X 0 X 2 ; X 1 X 3 ) and R C = I (X 0 X 3 ; X 1 X 2 ), which imply the following two inequalities:
, which yields a contradiction. Thus, this case does not exist.
APPENDIX B AN ALTERNATIVE PROOF FOR ACHIEVABILITY OF THEOREM 1
The general idea of achievability still follows the unified scheme as in Appendix A. In the step of codebook generation, instead of binning and then sub-binning, at terminal X 1 , randomly and independently assign a bin index f to each sequence x n 1 ∈ X n 1 , where f ∈ [1 : 2 nR 1 ]; and then randomly and independently assign another index φ to each sequence, where φ ∈ [1 : 2 n R 1 ]. Similarly, at terminal X 2 , randomly and independently assign a bin index g to each sequence x n 2 ∈ X n 2 , where g ∈ [1 : 2 nR 2 ]; and then randomly and independently assign another bin index ψ to each sequence, where ψ ∈ [1 : 2 n R 2 ]. At terminal X 3 , randomly and independently assign a bin index l to each sequence x n 3 ∈ X n 3 , where l ∈ [1 : 2 nR 3 ]. The steps of encoding and transmission, decoding and key generation are the same as the corresponding steps in Appendix A.
Next we derive sufficient conditions that guarantee key agreement and secrecy requirement simultaneously. Similarly to Appendix A, it can be shown that the Slepian-Wolf conditions (38)-(44) guarantee that the key generating parties agree on the same keys. To guarantee the secrecy requirement (5), it is equivalent to show that (φ, ψ) are independent of ( f, g, l) . It then suffices to show that φ, ψ, f, g, l are mutually independent. Applying [14, Th. 1], we obtain the following conditions (which even guarantee strong secrecy):
We note that by OSRB theorem (81)-(87) imply that ( f, φ), (g, ψ) and l are mutually independent. Moreover, by Appendix A or using OSRB one more time, (81) implies that f and φ are independent, and (82) implies that g and ψ are independent. Therefore, (81)-(87) imply that f, φ, g, ψ, l are mutually independent.
Finally, we apply Fourier Motzkin elimination to removẽ R 1 ,R 2 andR 3 from Slepian-Wolf conditions (38)-(44) and secrecy conditions (81)-(87), which yields the desired key rate region given in Theorem 1.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
C. Proof of Converse
First, if we need only to generate K 1 , the model reduces to the private key generation problem studied in [5] . The key capacity is shown to be
which provides an outer bound (14) on R 1 . Similarly, if we dedicated to generate K 2 , the key capacity is shown to be
}, which provides an outer bound (15) on R 2 . For the sum rate bound, we consider an enhanced model by replacing terminals X 1 and X 2 with a super terminal X s which observes both X n 1 and X n 2 . The rate of the private key between X 0 and X s concealed from terminal X 3 is upper bounded by I (X 0 ; X 1 , X 2 |X 3 ) as shown in [5] , which yields the sum rate bound (16) .
D. Proof of Achievability
The key capacity region is the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O as illustrated in Fig. 6 , where the coordinates of the points A and B are given by min{I (
The corner point A can be achieved by letting X 2 be a dedicated helper to generate K 1 following the omniscience scheme in [5] . The corner point B can be achieved by letting X 1 be a dedicated helper to generate K 2 as shown in [5] . We note that the point P would collapse to the point A if I (X 0 ; X 1 X 2 |X 3 ) ≤ I (X 1 ; X 0 X 2 |X 3 ) and the point Q would collapse to the point B if
. Thus, it is sufficient to show that the corner points P and Q are achievable whenever they are different from the points A and B, respectively.
We note that since the secrecy requirements on K 1 and K 2 are symmetric, it is sufficient to show that the corner point P is achievable, and then the achievability of the point Q follows by symmetry. Furthermore, we assume that
because otherwise the point P would collapse to the point A and has been justified to be achievable. The rate pair at the point P is given by
The idea to achieve the point P follows the same achievable strategy as in Appendix A. The steps of codebook generation, encoding and transmission, decoding and key generation are the same as the corresponding steps in Appendix A, and are omitted here. In particular, Slepian-Wolf conditions (38)-(44) also guarantee the correct key establishment here.
The secrecy requirement (6) here is different from that for symmetric key generation with a trusted helper. Hence, we next develop the sufficient conditions that guarantee (6) and then choose the binning rates to satisfy these sufficient conditions.
Secrecy: We evaluate the key leakage rates averaged over the random codebook ensemble. Let f := f (X n 1 ), g := g(X n 2 ) and l := l(X n 3 ). Then it is clear that F = { f, g, l}. We further let φ := φ(X n 1 ) and ψ := ψ(X n 2 ). Hence, K 1 = φ and K 2 = ψ. We first derive
We consider each of the six terms in (89). Similarly to the techniques used in [10, Appendix A], it can be shown that if
In order to bound the second term in (89), we have the following derivation:
It can be shown as in [18, Lemma 22.3] that if
then lim sup
Similarly, it can be shown that if
By noting that
, it is sufficient to bound the latter term:
Thus, (92) and (94) are sufficient conditions that guarantee the secrecy requirement (6) .
The rate pair at point P is given by (I (
. To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates as follows:
It is easy to verify that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (38)-(44), and the sufficient conditions (92) and (94) for secrecy.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 3
E. Proof of Converse
First, if we need only to generate K 1 , the model reduces to the secret key generation problem studied in [5] . The key capacity is shown to be min{R A , R C } which provides an upper bound on R 1 as given in (22). Next, if we dedicate to generate K 2 , the model reduces to the private key generation problem over multiple terminals also studied in [5] as the private key model. The key capacity is shown to be R B which serves as an upper bound (23) on R 2 . For the sum rate bound, we consider an enhanced model, which replaces terminals X 1 and X 2 with a super terminal X s that observes both X n 1 and X n 2 . Then, the secret key rate between X 0 and X s is upper bounded by R C as given in [5] for the secret key model, which yields the sum rate bound (24).
F. Proof of Achievability
The key capacity region is plotted in Fig. 7 as the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O, where the coordinates of the points A and B are (min{R A , R C }, 0) and (0, R B ), respectively. The corner point A is achieved by letting X 2 be a dedicated helper to generate K 1 following [5] . The corner point B is achieved by letting X 1 be a dedicated helper to generate K 2 following [5] . We note that the point P may collapse to the point A if R C ≤ R A , and the point Q may collapse to the point B if R C ≤ R B . It is thus sufficient to show the achievability of the points P and Q whenever they are different from the points A and B, respectively. Then the entire pentagon can be achieved by time sharing.
For the point P, it can be observed that its rate coordinates are exactly the same as those in Section III-A, and can be shown to be achievable by the same scheme designed in Appendix A for symmetric key generation with a trusted helper. The idea to achieve the point Q follows the same achievable strategy as in Appendix A. Hence, the steps of codebook generation, encoding and transmission, decoding and key generation are the same as the corresponding steps in Appendix A, and are omitted here. In particular, Slepian-Wolf conditions (38)-(44) guarantee the correct key establishment.
The secrecy requirement (7) here is different. Hence, we next derive sufficient conditions for achieving secrecy requirement (7). Then these sufficient conditions need to be verified for the point Q in all cases.
It can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if
Furthermore,
where we used the fact that H (X n 3 |X n 2 , C) = n H (X 3 |X 2 ) due to the assumption of discrete memoryless source.
It can be shown as in [18, Lemma 22.3 ] that if
We next consider the last term in (102):
Similarly, it can be shown as in Lemma 1 that if
Thus, (103), (104) and (105) are sufficient conditions that guarantee the secrecy requirements in (7) .
We next show the achievability of the point Q, whose rate coordinates are given by (R C − R B , R B ). Corresponding to different source distributions, each of R C and R B can take one of the two mutual information terms given in (24) and (23), respectively. Hence, the coordinates of the point Q can take four forms, i.e., case 1 with R C = I (X 0 ; X 1 X 2 X 3 ) and R B = I (X 0 ; X 2 X 3 |X 1 ); case 2 with R C = I (X 0 ; X 1 X 2 X 3 ) and R B = I (X 2 ; X 0 X 3 |X 1 ); case 3 with R C = I (X 0 X 3 ; X 1 X 2 ) and R B = I (X 0 ; X 2 X 3 |X 1 ); and case 4 with R C = I (X 0 X 3 ; X 1 X 2 ) and R B = I (X 2 ; X 0 X 3 |X 1 ). For each case, it is sufficient to set the ratesR 1 
The rate pair at the point Q is given by (I (X 0 ; X 1 ), I (X 0 ; X 2 X 3 |X 1 )). To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates in the achievable strategy as follows:
Otherwise, the rate pair can be easily achieved without the helper's assistance. It can also be verified that the above rates (110)-(114) satisfy the secrecy conditions (103), (104) and (105).
Case 2: R C = I (X 0 ; X 1 X 2 X 3 ) and R B = I (X 2 ; X 0 X 3 |X 1 ), which imply
The rate pair at the point Q is given by (I (X 0 ; X 1 X 3 ) − I (X 2 ; X 3 |X 1 ), I (X 2 ; X 0 X 3 |X 1 )). To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates in the achievable strategy as follows:
Otherwise the Markov chain X 3 − X 1 X 2 − X 0 holds, which violates the case condition (116). In particular,R 1 
It can also be verified that the above rates (117)-(121) satisfy the secrecy conditions (103) and (105). In particular, (105) holds under the following assumption
If the above assumption does not hold, then the Markov chain X 2 − X 1 − X 0 X 3 holds, which implies R 2 = I (X 2 ; X 0 X 3 |X 1 ) = 0. The point Q coincides with the point B, which has been justified to be achievable.
Then, we have
, which yields contradiction. Thus, this case does not exist.
The rate pair at the point Q is given by (I (X 1 ; X 0 X 3 ), I (X 2 ; X 0 X 3 |X 1 )). To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates in the achievable strategy as follows:
It is easy to verify that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (38)-(44) and the secrecy conditions (103), (104) and (105).
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 4
G. Proof of Converse
First, if we need only to generate K 1 , the model reduces to the private key generation problem over multiple terminals studied in [5] . The key capacity is shown to be min{I (X 1 ; X 0 X 2 |X 3 ), I (X 0 ; X 1 X 2 |X 3 )}, which serves as an upper bound (31) on R 1 . Next, if we dedicate to generate K 2 , it also reduces to the private key model studied in [5] . The key capacity is shown to be I (X 2 ; X 0 |X 1 X 3 ), which serves an upper bound (32) on R 2 . For the sum rate bound, we consider an enhanced model which replaces terminals X 1 and X 2 with a super terminal X s that observes both X n 1 and X n 2 . Then, the private key rate between X 0 and X s is upper bounded by I (X 0 ; X 1 , X 2 |X 3 ) due to the private key model in [5] , which yields the sum rate bound (33).
H. Proof of Achievability
The key capacity region is illustrated in Fig. 8 as the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O, where the coordinates of the points A and B are (min{I (X 0 ; X 1 X 2 |X 3 ), I (X 1 ; X 0 X 2 |X 3 )}, 0) and (0, I (X 0 ; X 2 |X 1 X 3 )), respectively. The corner point A is achieved by letting X 2 be a dedicated helper to generate K 1 following [5] . The corner point B is achieved by letting X 1 be a dedicated helper to generate K 2 following [5] . We note that the point P would collapse to the point A if I (X 0 ; X 1 X 2 |X 3 ) ≤ I (X 1 ; X 0 X 2 |X 3 ), and the point Q would collapse to the point B if I (X 0 ; X 1 X 2 |X 3 ) ≤ I (X 2 ; X 0 |X 1 X 3 ). It is thus sufficient to show the achievability of the points P and Q whenever they are different from the points A and B, respectively. Then the entire pentagon can be achieved by time sharing.
The idea to achieve the points P and Q follows the same achievable strategy described in Appendix A. The steps of codebook generation, encoding and transmission, decoding and key generation are the same as those in Appendix A, and are omitted here. In particular, Slepian-Wolf conditions (38)-(44) guarantee the correct key establishment. Since the secrecy requirements given in (8) are different, we next develop the sufficient conditions that guarantee (8) , and then choose the binning rates to satisfy these sufficient conditions.
Secrecy: We evaluate the key leakage rates averaged over the random codebook ensemble. Let f := f (X 
We next bound each of the five terms in (132) and (133). It can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if It can be shown as in [18, Lemma 22.3] that if 
Substituting (151) into (145), we conclude that if
then as n → ∞,
APPENDIX G PROOF OF THEOREM 5
By generalizing the unified scheme as in Appendix A to the multiple key case, the idea of achievability is as follows. In the codebook generation step, each terminal X k randomly and independently assigns a bin index f k to each sequence x n k ∈ X n k , where f k ∈ [1 : 2 nR k ]; and then randomly and independently assigns another index φ k to each sequence, where φ k ∈ [1 : 2 n R k ]. The steps of encoding and transmission, decoding and key generation are the same as the corresponding steps in Appendix A with extension for multiple key generation.
Next we derive sufficient conditions that guarantee key agreement and secrecy requirement simultaneously. It can be shown that the Slepian-Wolf conditions
for all S ⊂ [m] guarantee that the key generating parties agree on the same keys. To guarantee the secrecy requirement, it is equivalent to show that {φ k } are independent of { f k }. It then suffices to show that {φ k } and { f k } are mutually independent. By applying OSRB theorem ([14, Th. 1]), we obtain the following conditions:R
for all S ⊂ [m], which ensure the above mutual independence. Then, we apply Fourier Motzkin elimination to removẽ R S from Slepian-Wolf conditions (152) and secrecy conditions (153). In order to do this, we need some preliminary results on submodular function.
Recall that a function f : 
A function f is supermodular if − f is submodular. Moreover, given a submodular function f , we define a region R f as follows: We continue to show Lemma 2. Since g is supermodular, −g is submodular. If f (S) ≥ g(S) for all S ⊂ [m], we have that the zero vector 0 ∈ R f −g . From Lemma 3, there should exist some vector R 1 ∈ R f and R 2 ∈ R −g such that R 1 + R 2 = 0, i.e., R 2 = −R 
